Bio-semantics, ecology and content ascription by Rosas, Alejandro
BIO-SEMANTICS, ECOLOGY AND CONTENT ASCRIPTION 
Alejandro Rosas 
Depar tamento de Filosofia 
U niversidad Nacional de Colombia 
arosasl@unal.edu.co 
Res 11111e11: L os defensores de la b io-semant ica prop onen qu e el cont enido de las 
represen taciones sea fijado con referenc ia a su func i6n biol6gica. Sin embargo, una legft ima 
plural idad de func iones et iol6gicas para una representaci6n dada imp ide fijar el contenido. 
Los intentos de superar por medic de un a rgumento contrafac t ico esta d ificultad en la 
atribuci6n de cantenzdo han sido acusados de tergiversar la d istinci6n selecci6n para/ seleccz6n 
de. Recons truyo el argumento contrafactico en el contexto de los constrefi imientos al d isefio 
evolut ivo que subyacen a una teor(a ecol6gica de las presiones select ivas. Segu idan1en te, 
argumento que estos constrefi imien tos asignan un rol modesto a la funci6n et iol6gica en un 
metodo para la atr ibuc i6n de conten ido. Sin en1bargo, es to requ iere abandonar la tes is de que 
pensar en terminos de una funci6n etiol6gica resuelve a priori la atr ibuci6n de conten ido; en 
part icular, no puede reemplazar la experimentaci6n y la teor izac i6n cognit iva. T ai como lo 
han advertido los ec6logos de! comportamiento, las fu nciones biol6gicas no deben ser tan 
facilmente traduc idas a mecanismos pr6ximos, en particular perceptuales. 
Palabras clave: b io-semantica, contenido, fu nciones etiol6gicas, ecologla, Neander, 
representac iones. 
Abstract: Advocates o f b io-semant ics propose that the content of representations be fixed 
•N i th reference to their b iological func tion. A legit imate p lural ity of et io logical functions for 
a g iven representat ion, however, stands in the 'Nay of fix ing content. Attempts to overcon1e 
th is problem for content ascripti'on 'N ith a counterfactu al argument have been accused of 
misusing the seledtonfarlselecti.on ef dis t inct io n. I recons truc t the counterfactual argument 
in the context of the constraints on evolut ionary des ign that under l ie an ecological theory 
of selection pressures. I then argue that these constra ints ass ign a modest role to etiological 
function in a method for con tent ascript ion. But it requires abandoning the cla im that a 
priori thinking in terms of et iological funct ion w ill solve content ascription; in part icular, 
it cannot replace cognitive theory and experimentation. As behavioural ecologists have 
'Nar ned, b iological funct ions should not be too qu ickly translated into proxin1ate, in part icular 
perceptual, mechan isms. 
Key lvord s: b io- sema nt ics, cont ent, e t io log ical fu n ct ions, eco logy, Nea nder, 
representat ions. 
I. INDETERMINACY: THE CHALLENGE 
T heories of content can be under stood as answer ing two differe nt concerns. T he first one 
is a concern about content ascn.ption and asks: tuhat content (and what type of content) does a 
g iven representat ion have? Ho"vv do we establish this when "vve attr ibute representat ions to other 
minds? A more fundamental concern is t he follo"vving: Ho"vv do "vVe know "vvhether any g iven 
mental item has content? In virtue of "vvhat does it have content? T his paper is concerned about 
bio-semant ics as an answer to the fi rst question. I t inquires "vvhether bio-semant ics solves the 
problem of content-ascription, not on "vvhether it proposes a plausible (naturalist ic) analysis of the 
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relat ion"- has the content that - ". Arguably. bio- semantics fails on this second task (Pietroski 
1992), but so does any other theory that purports to offer a non-circular analys is, naturalistic 
or not. Bio-semantics can be con strued modestly as an attempt to answer the first quest ion. As 
such it w ill be treated in this paper. 
Bio-semantics (also known as teleosemantics) '.Vas born as a plausible solu t ion to the 
indeterminacy affecting causal theor ies of content. For it is a consequence of casual theor ies 
that a g iven representation represents every event that actually cau ses it, even if it is not vvhat 
it is supposed to represent. Bio-semant ics is meant to overcome this d ifficul ty: it proposes to nail 
dovvn the appropr iate content by I inking the representat ional state to its biological func t ion. T he 
classical trial for this approach is the content of a frog's representational brain-state vvhen it fl icks 
its tongue to catch prey If its funct ion is to represent those vvorldly conditions in t he presence 
of wh ich the flick of the tongu e vvill normal ly lead to the ingestion of food, these condit ions 
are the content of its representation. However, it has turned out very d ifficult to descr ibe these 
conditions univocally Do frogs fl ick the ir tongues at flies (McGinn 1989 and Sterelny 1990 )? Do 
they fl ick their tongues at food (Shapiro 1992 and M illikan 1989)? Do vve have to knovv firs t their 
desires, if they have any (Papineau 1998), in order to knovv vvhat t hey fl ick their tongues at? Or 
do they simply snap at small, black moving things (Neander 1995) or perhaps at black, moving, 
non-dangerous food (Agar 1993)? T he proposals can be multiplied. Bio-semantics seems to end 
up vvith an indeterminacy problem of its ovvn. 
Advocates of bio-semantics give a cogent explanation for this mul tip! icity T raits are adapt ive 
vvhen they enhance the fi tness (reproduct ive success) of an orgun ism, but they do not usual ly 
enhance fit ness as an immediate effect. T hey enhance fit ness t hrough a causal chain of events, 
involv ing several steps unt il the relevant fitness effect emerges (Neander 1995} Accordingly, 
the funct ion of a trait receives a d ifferent descr iption, depend ing on the event in the cau sal 
chain one chooses to focus on (Goode & Griffiths 1995)· T he proposals listed above are equally 
good cand idates for the funct ion of the frog' s brain-state because they ment ion I inks in a chain 
of events leading from the frog's bra in-state to its reproductive success. T he frog's brain-state 
causes a tongue- flic k at things that are black, mov ing and smal l, thereby catching fl ies, thereby 
feeding vvell, thereby building an effic ient and healthy body and thereby increasing its chances 
of reproductive success. T hat trait vvas selected because it did all these things. T hey are equal ly 
entitled to be called its fu nct ions (Goode & G riffi ths 1995)· T his expla ins the plural ity of proposals 
for the biological funct ion of t hat trait as legit imate. It solves t he indeterminacy problem affecting 
funct ion ascr ipt ions, or at least shovvs t hat the indeterminacy is not harmful. Hovvever, one is left 
vvith various possibili t ies of content ascr iption. 
Neander suggests that it is possible to choose one among this plurality of genu ine funct ions 
as spec ific to a g iven trait by focusing on the phenomenon of malfunction (Neander 1995). T he 
specific function of a trait is the immediate effect whose absence univocally ind icates that the t rait 
is malfunctioning, because no other tra it possibly contr ibutes to its absence. T his solution may be 
applied to detector devices as vvell. In order to find vvhich content detector devices are desig ned 
to respond to, Neander's strategy suggests d irectly probing, through cognitive experiments, 
into the dev ice and its detecting states. But if cognit ive exper iments can solve the question of 
the content of representations, vvhat is the use of a select ionist approach to the mind advocated 
by bio- semantics? If, on the other hand, we approach content from the vievvpoint of select ive 
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pressures, 'Ne \Nill tend to direct attentio n, a priori, to funct ions located h igher up in the causal 
cha in leading to a fitness enhancement. Since these tvvo methods result in d ifferen t content 
ascriptions, the indeterminacy problem pers ists. Hovvever, it is my purpose to argue that there 
is no indeterminacy here. What is required is a methodological decision. Cognit ive experiments 
inquir ing into con ten t and theoretical thinking in terms of selective h istories must be assigned 
different, but methodologically complementary roles in t he task of conten t ascription. 
2. F ALLAc 1ous CoUNTERFACTUALs? 
Let us call 'D' the brain-state (type) of the perceptual system t hat signal s the presence of 
whatever it is that it signals to the neural system that causes the flick of the tongue. Cognitive 
experiments (Lettvin et al 1959) suggest t hat 'small, black, moving t hing' is a correct description 
of the con tent registered by D. Let us assume that this is the case. T his is the fir st I ink in a cha in 
of events leading ultimately to a fitness enhancement: Detection of a small, black, moving thing 
triggers the fl ick of the tongue; the frog thereby catches a fly (in normal environments), thereby 
feeds, t hereby builds or maintains its body, thereby contributes to its reproduct ive success. In 
Neander's terms, signal I ing to some o ther system in the frog's brain the presence of small, black, 
moving things is the spec ific effect for vvhich the frog's brain state is directly responsible. The 
frog's detector device malfunctions if it fails to instantiate D vvhen a small black moving thing 
passes through its v isual field. Part ic ipan ts in the debate have argued against fix ing t he content 
of D through these experimental results. T hey use the follovving counterfactual, theoretical 
argument: if D caused the frog to snap at small, black, moving things, but did not cause it to take 
food in, D vvould not have been selected. T herefore, D must signal t he presence of food rather 
than of small, black, moving t h ings, even if 'small, black, moving t h ing' happens to be a cor rect 
description of a stimulus that causes brain-state D. 
T he argument contains a plausible claim: that in absence of a correlation betvveen fi·og food 
and small, black and moving th ings, a brain- state vv ith the latter content vvould no t have been 
selected. T his claim depends on a plausible hypothesis about the biological function of t he 
larger system where the detector device does its vvork. But as already noted in t he literature, 
the argument uses vvrongly the t heory of biological function s ag<linst the results of cognitive 
experiments. Consider iterating t he argument aguinst t he thesis that the brain-state signals 
food: If a brain-state signal ling food caused t he fi·og to feed vvell, but not to reproduce (because 
normal frog food in t he frog's evolutionary environment happened to produce steril ity), then a 
brain-state representing food vvould not have been selected. But this vvould take us all the vvay 
to the claim that 'reproduction enhancer' is the only legit imate function and the only legit imate 
content of such a brain-state; and this is nonsen se. Counterfactuals of t his sort canno t shovv that 
a state representing small, black, moving things could no t have been selected. Even if they are 
true, t hey do not allow any one even t in a stable casual chain to be chosen as more appropriate 
than any other one to qua! ify either as the func tion or the content. The stab ility of the casual 
cha in leading up to fitness sanctions every I ink in the chain as a genuine funct ion of the tr a it. 
T his use of counterfactuals could easily appear as an abuse of Sober~s selection.for/selection 
ef distinct ion: it looks as if authors vvere arguing for t he t hesis that there has been selection ef 
brain-states that detect small, black, moving things, but no selection.for those states (Goode & 
Griffiths 1995). Sober's dist inction is mean t to remind us of the fact that the total set of effects 
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of adaptive traits is larger than the set of effectsfar..,,vhich the trait 'vvas selected. Hearts pump 
blood and produce noise, so 'vvhen hearts are selected, pumping blood and producing noise are 
both selected. But uni ike pumping blood, producing noise is not somethingfardoingivhicha heart 
has been selected. It is merely a side-effect produced by the pumping mechanism 'vvhich hearts in 
fact use (muscle contraction). In contrast to noise production, muscle contraction is something 
far doing ivhich tokens of hearts have been selected. Hearts pump blood by muscle contraction 
but they do not pump blood by producing noise. 
Similarly, if frogs detect food by detect ing small, black, moving things, then there has been 
selection both for detecting food and for detect ing small, black, moving things. Detecting small, 
black, moving things is not a mere side-effect of detecting food, but a capacity through 'vvhich 
frogs detect food . Here 'vve have t'vvo effects far doingwhzch the frog's brain-state has been selected 
to cause the flick of the tongue. In the environment 'vvhere this state evolved, it happened that 
snapping at small, black, moving things was eflen enough snapping at frog food. In the same 'vvay, 
all content ascriptions used by partic ipants in t he current debate truly name effects far doing 
zvhich the brain-state in question 'vVas selected. They describe in every case events in the chain 
leading up to fitness. T herefore, no appeal to Sober's distinct ion 'vvill be able to support an a 
priori argument for ascribing content on the basis of any one effect 'vvithin this chain rather than 
any other one. 
Goode &. Griffiths (1995) think that Sterelny (1990), Shapiro (1992), and in a more subtle 
manner Ag-ar [11] are guilty of supporting their favourite candidate for function and content 
'vvith this misuse of Sober's dist inction. Neander (1995) and Papineau (1998) think this applies to 
Millikan (1989) as well. I w ill not try to decide whether or not these authors are guilty of this 
fal lacy Rather, I 'vvill show that the counter factual argument can be read in a different 'vvay, as 
having an altogether d ifferent point in mind. 
3. B10-sEMANT1cs: THE OmGINAL I NSI GHT 
Counterfactual reasoning of the sort employed in this debate makes sense 'vvhen one takes 
a particular view of the original insight behind bio-semantics. This insight is not only that 
etiological functions prov ide a privileged standpoint for understanding mind, but that a selectionist 
approach should spec ifically target those functions 'vvhich have been the focus of the behavioural 
ecologist's theory of animal behaviour; namely the famous four Fs of biology: feeding, fighting 
con-specific rivals, fleeing from predators and mating. This way of reading the argument supports 
the privileged status of one point in the chain lead ing up to fitness, but not by way of misusing 
Sober's distinction. As 'vv ill be explained below, the rationale behind this privileged status is a 
robust theory about adaptive design. This theory is able to offer gu idance to direct experimental 
inquiry into representational content. 
If 'vve view bio- semantics as defending not only etiological func t ions, but more specifically 
the classification of behaviours and their evolutionary functions that is current in behavioural 
ecology, the internal quarrel among advocates of bio-semantics can be construed as a quarrel 
about the significance of the four F' s of biology for the an evolutionary approach to mind and 
cognit ion. On one side, 'vVe find those authors 'vvho have defended some variant of the thesis 
that the content of the fi·og's brain-state is or includes food. I am consider ing the fly-thesis as 
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a variant of the food-thesis: flies or organic substances in general are JU St instances of edible 
prey. Save for Neander. practically every participant in the debate defends this claim. Neander 
(1995) called this camp 'high church' teleosemant1cs ('standard teleosem::tnt1cs' 1n Neander 1996). 
Standard teleosemantics appeals, not to the immediate effect - vvhich is the correct one for talk 
of malfunction to make sense - but to a higher-level effect in the chain of events leading up to 
fitness. I vvill l::tbel this camp 'ecological bicrsemantics' . Authors in this C<lmp assume, explicitly or 
not. that the functions which are going to help us get a grip on the nature of mind are precisely 
those vvh1ch beh::tv1oural ecologists find illuminating vvhen studying animal behaviour. According 
to behaviourcl ecology. feeding is one of the basic functions in terms of which animals are 
usually designed. 
Neander' s position rep1-esents the other camp (she has argued that Dretske belongs here too: 
see Neander 1996). Even though she thinks that selection pressures explain mental content, she 
seen1s committed to deny that a universal theory of selection pressures, as commonly defended by 
behavioural ecologists. will help us decide bet'Vveen the several possibili ties of content ascription. 
Direct cogn itive investigation into content vv ill be more appropriate to the task. 
Wh::tt is ::tt st::tke is t he plausibility of an appeal to the biological function of larger systems 
embedding cognitive devices to guide content ascription. Ecolog1cru bicrsemanticists believe that 
behaviour::tl ecology and its theory of basic selection pressur·es should provide a privileged access 
to mind. its structure and its representational content. One consequence is that the frog's brain-
state that causes the flick of the tongue is bound to represent food . since feeding is one of the 
basic functions in terms of vvh1ch natural selection designs organisms. Hovvever. the behavioural 
ecologist's theory of functions vvill illuminate representational content only if particular 
conditions obt::t1n. In the follo"ving, I will try to spell out these conditions. In any case, the upshot 
"viii be th::tt ecological thinking cannot be used to build aprzonstzc and 'armchair' arguments. but 
as a methodological guide to be used in combination vvith cognitive experiments. 
4. ADAPTIVE CoNSTRAINTS ON E VOLUTIONARY D ESIGN 
Under adaptive constraints I understand capacities that organisms must have if they a1-e to be 
adaptively designed at all. Without intending to be exhaustive. I vvill mention some that appear 
to be non-controversial. Some people may view their non-controversial character to follow 
from the fact that they are true by defin it ion. I vvill not take any s ides on whether they are true 
by definit ion or rather because of the theory vve currently hold. My argument vvill h inge on 
a difference in status betvveen these necessary capacities and others that are clearly contingent. 
Among the capacities that are necessa0· in this sense, the following c::tn be mentioned: 
l. Organisms must be able to reproduce, or to help relatives reproduce.' 
2 . Organisms must be able to take in energy from the environment. th::tt is, to feed. 
3. Feeding includes, necessarily, the ability to detect relevant substances ::tnd to carry out 
activities for incorpo1-ating them into the organism. 
If we would count conceivable immortal beings as life forms. we would have to re-define biolog1cal fitness; but 
such theoretical possibilibes are not relevant in our cu1Tent biology. 
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Notice that all these capacities are general and may be realized by a variety of different 
mechanisms 'vvith a variety of specific operations. Behav ioural ecology focuses initial ly at this 
general level of description. Therefore, this level of description can appropriately be cal led the 
ecological level of description of the capac it ies of an organism. 
Biology is also interested in finding the spec ific mechanisms that real ize those capac ities in 
particular spec ies: 
4. Particular mechanisms for detecting and taking food in, even though they all respond 
to this general description, may be very variable in the specific operations by "vhich they 
detect and take in food.2 
Statements 1-3 express rough truths about living organisms; they represent capac ities that 
organisms must have if they are to be adaptively designed. These fall under the four Fs of 
biology. Assuming that they have been designed by natural selection, 'vve can conveniently call 
these capacities the ecologi.cal-le::;el effects of biological design. In contrast, capacities mentioned 
in statement 4 - bits of mechanisms or their immed iate operations, by which a l iv ing be ing in a 
g iven environment detects and tal<es in food - allow of many d ifferent versions. Their reliability 
is highly sensitive to changes in env ironmental conditions. Assuming they have been designed 
by natural selection, 'vve can conveniently call them the mechanism-level effects of biological 
design. 
Both ecological-level and mechanism-level effects are selected effects, things for doing which 
selection re'vvards a g iven design. Ho"vever, the difference is important. The frog's brain-state 
D (type, not token) that med iates bet"veen a distal food-stimulus and the flick of the tongue is a 
mechanism-level effect. There is a point in saying that unless D causes the frog to snap at food 
often enough, there will be no selection for D, but selection for some other state, or else frogs 
constructed 'vvith D 'vvill go. But there is no comparable point in saying that unless feed ing leads 
to fitness, no selection for feeding will take place, but rather selection for something else. The 
difference bet'vveen both statements results from the d ifference bet'vveen ecological-level and 
mechanism-level effects. Natural selection has practically fixed the link among ecological-level 
effects: the link that leads from feeding "vell to reproduction and to fitness. Capacities belonging 
to this level are as good as fixed requirements for build ing adapted organisms. This is the reason 
why they have been included among the four F' s of biology. 
Natural selection does not in the same "vay embrace any capacity belonging to the mechanism-
level. The effects of biological design at the level of mechan isms are h ighly sensitive to 
env ironmental change. Natural selection vvill start 'vvith rough designs that "vill do their job 
only across a I imited range of environmental variation. The reliability "vi th vvhich effects at this 
level "vill enhance fitness depends strongly on environmental stability. It is not difficult to think 
of variations in environmental cond it ions that would make a particular "vay of identifying prey 
obsolete. In contrast . it is practical ly impossible to think of variations such that, leaving the 
reliability of capacities at the mechanism-level untouched, they "vould nevertheless d isrupt the 
path that leads from level 3 through r and to fitness. 
' In particular, as we will see, food detectors that mediate between a given stin1ulus and bodily move1nents may 
use representations, but they do not have to. 
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5. THE P ornT IN CoUNTERFACTUAL ARGUMENTS 
Let us no'.v see ho"vv these facts about biological design coul d motivate cou nterfactual 
thinking in the conte xt of t he indeterminacy of funct ion and content. We "vvant to find out 
"vvhat would be the point in saying that there "vvould have been no selection for brain-state D 
(type) represent ing smal l, black, mov ing th ings if snapping at food had not been one of its 
effects. Why should th is counterfactual be less t r iv ial than one stat ing that unless feeding "vvel l 
enhanced the ability to reproduce, t hen a brain-state D represent ing food would not have been 
of any he! p e ither? 
I t hink the clue lies in the biological fac ts stated in section 4. A counterfactual cond it ion ing 
an effect at the mechan ism level to an ecological-level effect has a point t hat is absent in a 
counterfactual condit ion ing one ecological-level effect to another ecological-level effect. In the 
causal process that controls the evolution of any g iven trait, natural select ion is count ing on 
a stable causal connect ion bet"vveen the ecological-level effects and fitness: feed ing "vvell, fl eeing 
from predator s and w inning fights against con-specific r ivals in mating contests are abili t ies 
that contr ibute to successful reproduction. T he chain leading up to fitness "vv ill rarely break up 
in the causal links connecting those abili ties to reproductive success. In cont rast, t he connection 
bet"vveen the mechan ism-level effects and those ab ilit ies is frag ile. T he selection of effects at the 
mechan ism level depends on ho"vv reliably they lead up to effects at the ecological level. T heir 
reliability in this sense will depend on ho"vv "vvell t hey perform on the face of env ironmental 
change. Since there is no guarantee that the ir performance will be constant under change, the 
chain leading up to fit ness w ill often break at the mechanism level. 
Natural select ion "vvill work to increase the fitness of tra its by increasing the reliability of 
mechan ism-level effects in achiev ing the ecological-level ones. Ho"vv often natural selection re-
designs mechan isms, will depend on ho"vv often the environment changes, and "vvithin which 
ranges of variation; on ho"vv challeng ing these changes are; and on "vvhether natural selection 
finds solutions to them. In v iew of these histor ical cont ingencies, a counterfactual statement 
that cond itions selection for a mechanism-level effect on the achievement of an ecological-level 
one, may be try ing to make one of two point s. Let us look at them in the particular example of 
the frog' s detecting device. 
5.1 Food 1ueakl:y slutpes state D 
Suppose the ancestors of frogs initial ly detected food through brain-state D and that the 
content of this state was far from frog-food or from "vvhatever orgu.n ic substance occup ied that 
role. It happened to be easy for natural select ion to constru ct a state "vvith this content. By happy 
chance, this content was reliable enough in t he ancestral environment of frogs to make them 
tongue-fl ick at su itable food. Suppose that the frog's environment did not relevantly change 
over time to challenge the capability of this brain-state in accomplishing it s function. Under 
these histor ical cond it ions, bra in-state D "vvas probably a quick and dirty "vvay of designing the 
frog's food detecting abilit ies, and endured due to t he convenient, but lucky and perhaps atypical, 
diachron ic uniformity in the frog's environment. If one then says that no select ion for D "vVould 
have happened if D had not (luckily) cau sed the frog to snap at food, one may be suggest ing that 
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it is not due to the special virtues of D, but to lucky correlat ion, that D performs its expected 
job of enabling the frog to feed vvell. 
In connection vvith the above, if D registers the presence of a stimulus affecting one sense 
only and, on that basis, inflexibly triggers the flick of the tongue to catch prey, the counterfactual 
statement could be suggesting a d ifference betvveen tvvo capac ities, namely detecting and 
representing Though the frog's brain-state detects and registers a stimulus, it does not, strictly 
speaking, represent. The I inguistic stipulation introduced here is not meant as an analysis of our 
concept of representation. It points to a plausible distinction betvveen two capacities, hovvever vve 
call them. For one capacity, cal l it representing, it is a necessary condition, though not a sufficient 
one, that its tokens indicate the presence of environmental features by we ighing inputs coming 
from d ifferent perceptual sources. When those features are essential to achieve a goal that is 
important for surv ival (like feeding), representations undervvrite the ability to transfer a given 
behaviour (e.g. the tongue-fl ick) across d ifferent perceptual situations. 3 The counterfactual would 
then be used to suggest that D does not have the special virtues vve attribute to representations. 
5.2 Food str01igly shapes state D 
Alternatively, if it is emp irically implausible to assume a d iachron ic uniformity in the 
env ironment of a g iven organism, the same counterfactual could be used to express a rather 
different point. If historical and/ or comparative ev idence suggests that the env ironment of 
ancestral frogs, or of the ancestor- spec ies of modern fi·ogs, changed often and vvithin a vvide 
range of conditions, the suggestion would be that selection for a brain-state D as a quzck and 
dirty vvay of registering through a simple proximal stimulus (sense qua! ity) the presence of 
a distal one (food) is uni ikely The expectation is that environmental changes will have forced 
D to adjust to these changes to keep a good record at detecting food across a relatively vvide 
range of condit ions. Adjustment to changes could have forced D to track food across different 
sense data and the ir combinations. Suppose that at the beginning of their natural history, frogs 
(or their ancestors) tracked food based on smell only, and d id not need to take account of size 
because everything that smelled I ike prey had a suitable size. A simple environmental change, i.e. 
bigger-than-frogs prey-smelling animals, vvould force frogs to track their food based on smell 
and size. Such a chal lenge vvould force brain-state D to evolve tovvards a representational state, 
one vvhich ind icates the presence of that at vvhich to tongue- flick on the basis of data coming 
from different perceptual sources. 
6. FuNCTIONS AND NATURAL I-IIsTORY 
The preceding considerations allovv for useful counterfactual reasoning in the context of 
ecological bio- semantics. Counterfactual reasoning gives ecological-level effects a special role in 
the causal process that decides the shape and fitness value of a trait. This can be justified by a 
plausible set of assumptions concerning the causal connections that natural selection counts on 
3 I follow a suggestion by Kim Sterelny (2000) who attr ibutes representations to animals when they multitrack an 
environmental feature in a way that enables them to transfer a behavioural response across different perceptual situations 
to achieve a goal. However, I am not committed to the view that these representations support the context-free recombinant 
skills of full.fledged conceptual abilities. Cf. Susan Hurley's analysis and interpretation of experimental work to probe the 
conceptual skills of animals (Hurley 2003). 
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-..,vhen des1gn1ng organisms. Ho-..,vever, the privileged status of facts concerning e.g. the frog's 
nuti·itional state does not automatically imply that they have robustly shaped brain- state D. 
It is still possible that D simply registers a proximal stimulus that picks out food 1n virtue 
of a superficial but stable correlation bet...veen food and some sense qua! ity. Frogs may have 
been around for quite a long time now, but then no one can be sure a pnon that this is partly 
because the frog's food-detector adjusted to repeated environmental challenges concerning 
food-detection. Perhaps those challenges never took place and perhaps frogs -..,vould have 
disappeared if they had. If the environment of ancestral frogs had in fact changed in the 
relevant ways to pose ever ne"v challenges, then tha.t -..,vould be one argument in favour of the 
thesis that the food-detector must have moved closer and closer to representing, rather than 
simply detecting. frog-food. 
Insistence on dnta coming from natural h istory reflects our· present I ack of theory concerning 
the evolut ion of cognition. For example, does the bare existence of different sense organs in 
an organism imply that it is already beyond brain-states that n1erely register one-dimensional 
sense stimuli and are able to represent things crucial to surv ival. i.e., that they multi-track those 
things by -..,veighing evidences coming from different sources? This is possible, but not certain 
on our present kno-..,vledge. Consider for example an early frog-food detector that started -..,vith a 
brain-state D that tracked visual sense-data coming typically from flies. The data registered by 
the detector -..,vere such that Pr (D I flies present) -..,vas high. but the Pr (flies present I D) -..,vas 
lo-..,v. by giving many false positives. The detector -..,vas not able to discriminate bet...veen flies and 
fly-looking creatures, given the stimuli that it picked out. Suppose fa! se pos1t1ves later turned out 
to be noxious. The detector responded by changing its data registers to increase Pr (flies present 
I D). 1.e. to increase the probability that the content indicated fl 1es. and flies only. by tracking, for 
example. flight patterns "v1th certain characteristics. But alternatively. the detector could have 
coped with those changes by s-..,vitching to other type of prey. fo1· example -..,vorms. by changing 
its data-registers so that they would register some other movement pattern. Since, after any of 
these changes. the detector still tracks food or flies on the basis of one sense only (v1s1on) one 
should not say that D represents flies or food. As a necessary condition for representzng flies or 
food. D should have gone beyond registering sense data on one dimension. by at least combining 
data coming from different senses. 
Alternatively. the frog's detector could have responded to environmental change by using 
representations. combining inputs fi·om different sense-organs. For example. the fi·og's detector 
could acquire someth ing like a d igestive-system-directed representation for certain types of 
nutrients thnt it "vould identify following different types of data (visual. gustatory, olfactory and 
feedback from sensations in the digestive system). Since it is likely that sensations of hunger 
originating in the digestive system are responsible for putting the food detector in alert mode . it 
is also plausible that the food detector -..,viii receive feedback from positive or negative digestive 
sensations after ingestion. Since they plausibly shape the frog's detector. they are relevant to 
solve the problem of content ascription. 
Now. cons1der1ng the fact that these and other possibil it1es are open for the historical evolution 
of the fi·og's detecto1· and its representational capacities. it seems to me that some participants 
in the debate are mistaken "vhen they proceed as if a pnon th1nk1ng 1n terms of function will 
solve the problem by leading to one univocal result. 
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7. NEANDER AND SELECTION PRESSURES 
The selection pressures invoked by behav ioural ecologists suggest t hat a cognit ive mechanism 
1 inked to feeding behaviour should have food as its content. But as argued above, this 'Nill depend 
on the type of h istory undergone by the cognitive device. Contrary to 'llvhat ecological b io-
semantics assumes, historical details could have favoured a device based on one-d imensional data, 
luckily correlated 'llvith frog-food . I believe this possibility is accounted for in Neander's position 
and in her conviction that a bio-semantic approach "viii not necessarily tie psychological sc ience 
to an ecological classification of behaviours and their fu nctions (I995). This is a deviation from 
standard bio- semantics, but this deviation is not a sign of mistaken reasoning. It is a possib ility 
within selectionist v ie'llvs on m ind: it follo'llVS from the fact, explained above, that ecological-level 
effects may only 'llvealdy shape the content of representational devices. 
The crucial d ifference bet'llveen Neander and ecological bio-semantics is the stance she is adopting 
to'llvards the consequences of admitting a selectionist approach to mind. On her view, ecological 
selection pressures on the foraging system of an organism g ive no specific clues reg-arding the 
cognit ive devices in the system. Even if selection pressures explain the existence of particular 
representations, '\/Ve do not need, or cannot hope, to determine what they represent by think ing about 
what those pressures have been. We can and must do it independently as cognit ive psychologists, 
by looking into the mechanism 'llv ith the appropriate experiments. 
Ho'llvever, Neander's position seems to decree a priori that a theory of ecological functions 'llv ill 
not be helpful in determining content. Her hypothesis about the con ten t of t he frog's detecting 
state - 'small, black moving thing' -rel ies too heav ily on the experiments repor ted by Lettvin 
et al (1959). This classic paper reports experimental evidence regarding the v isual cues that the 
frog's brain-state responds to 'llvhen it fl icks its tongue. But the experiments they report 'llvere 
not designed to prove t hat the frog tongue- flicks in response to v isual cues exclusively. Later 
experimentation has shown that this is not the case. Alcock (200I ) reports experiments sho'llving 
that toads (and tree frogs) learn to discriminate inedible insects after one single experience: 
they 'llv ill not later fl ick t heir tongue at those insects. This means t hat the detector associates 
v isual 'llvith gustatory cues and does not respond to v isual cues alone. T his is 'llvhat one 'llvould 
expect when allo'llving for the possib ility that ecological-level effects (catching edible prey) have 
cont r ibuted robustly to shape food-detectors. Neander seems to ignore this possibili ty al together. 
Surely, more complexity would be required to say that frogs represent food, but the ir detecting 
devices are in fact closer to 'llvhat vve would call representing food than if they responded to 
nothing else than to visual cues. 
8. CONTENT AND SELECTION PRESSURES: CONCLUSION 
T he relation betvveen cogn itive investigation into representational content and the selectional 
approach to content is a particular case of the more general problem of relating biological 
functions (those handled in behavioural ecology) to proximate mechanisms. Ethologists and 
behavioural ecologists usually stress that b iological fu nctions should not be too quickly translated 
into proximate, in particular perceptual, mechanisms (Krebs and Davies 1997). Biological funct ions 
can and should serve as a guide to t he investig-ation of proximate mechan isms, but both should 
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not be confused. For ecological bio-semantics, this amount s to a vvarning not to infer conten t 
too quickly fi·om ecological funct ion. One cannot infer a priori that detector devices represent 
precisely vvhat the behavioural theorists vievv as t heir ecological-level effects. Inferences of that 
sort should be carefully supported vvith empirical evidence, e ither h istorical-comparative or 
cognit ive-psychological. On the o ther hand, s ince ecological-level effects are u lt imately responsible 
for shaping mechanism-level effects, cognitive scientist s are well advised to accept guidance from 
ecological t h in king. A fruitful interaction betvveen an evolutionary and a cognitive approach 
should allovv theory about ecological selection pressures to guide hypotheses concerning such 
matters as representational content or psychological ar ch itecture; and inversely, ecological theory 
should resort to cognitive experimentation on representational capacit ies in order to test those 
hypotheses. For the specific case of the frog's food-detector, thinking in ecological terms suggests 
that visual data vv ill not be t he only sen se-data conta ined in the represen tational states 1 inked to 
its foraging behaviour. And this suggest ion has turned out to be t rue. 
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